The Contemporary Meaning of Virtue Ethics

 

 

Stanislaw Barszczak

The Contemporary Meaning of Virtue Ethics, a study of Alisdair MacIntyre’s philosophy

Introduction

The Philosophical task by the contemporary thinker Alisdaire MacIntyre is to try to express the concepts embedded in the practices of our lives in order to help us live morally worthy lives. Though we should at least try to do it. The professionalization of philosophy into a technical field- what might be called the academic captivity of philosophy- reflects the compartmentalization of the advanced capitalistic social orders that produce our culture of experts, those strange creatures of authority in modernity.

The philosopher insists, we say the question: “ ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” (see, Alasdair MacIntyreAfter Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Third Edition). Aristotle and Jesus say they are essential to fulfilling the pre-existing telos of man as man. Alisdair MacIntyre further states: “but the concept of a person is that of a character abstracted from a history.” The Philosopher saw the problem here: “would certainly not have admired Jesus Christ and he would have been horrified by St Paul- does.” In a slightly different context he cites the example: “Charles II once invited the members of the Royal Society to explain to him why a dead fish weighs more than the same fish alive; a number of subtle explanations were offered to him. He then pointed out that it does not.” So, Alisdaire MacIntyre even says: “we are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own narratives.”

Alisdair MacInytre also calls for a recognition of the other lives, the histories, and the traditions in which our stories are embedded. The thinker, of course, aims to influence not only how historians write history, but also how individuals live lives of virtue. The author of that essay, he is missing his mode of thought, his controversial assumptions and assertions.

 

  1. Personality philosopher

Alisdair MacIntyre is a key figure in the recent surge of interest in virtue ethics, which identifies the central question of morality as having to do with the habits and knowledge concerning how to live a good life. His approach seeks to demonstrate that good judgment emanates from good character. Being a good person is not about seeking to follow formal rules. In elaborating this approach, MacIntyre understands himself to be reworking the Aristotelian idea of an ethical teleology.( see, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alasdair_MacIntyre)

The thinker emphasises the importance of moral goods defined in respect to a community engaged in a ‘practice’-which he calls ‘internal goods’ or ‘goods of excellence’- rather than focusing on practice-independent obligation of a moral agent (deontological ethics) or the consequences of a particular act (utilitarianism). Alisdair MacIntyre has argued that Thomas Aquinas‘ synthesis of Augustinianism with Aristotelianism is more insightful than modern moral theories by focusing upon the telos (‘end’, or completion) of a social practice and of a human life, within the context of which the morality of acts may be evaluated. His seminal work in the area of virtue ethics can be found in his 1981 book, “After Virtue.”

The philosopher intends the idea of virtue to supplement, rather than replace, moral rules. Indeed, he describes certain moral rules as ‘exceptionless’ or unconditional. MacIntyre considers his work to be outside “virtue ethics” due to his affirmation of virtues as embedded in specific, historically grounded, social practices.(see, Alisdair MacIntyre, “On having survived the academic moral philosophy of the twentieth century”, lecture of March 2009)

Politically, MacIntyre’s  ethics informs a defence of the Aristotelian ‘goods of excellence’ internal to practices against the modern pursuit of ‘external goods’, such as money, power, and status, that are characteristic of rule-based, utilitarianWeberian modern institutions. Informed by MacIntyre’s critique, Aristotelianism loses its sense of elitist complacency; moral excellence ceases to be part of a particular, historical practice in ancient Greece and becomes a universal quality of those who understand that good judgment emanates from good character. Though, it has been argued that MacIntyre’s thought is unable to provide a coherent and effective model for a justifiable and politically stable political order, due to its neglect of political theology.( Thaddeus J. Kozinski (2010). The political problem of religious pluralism: And why philosophers can’t solve it. Lexington Books. p. 13. ISBN 978-0-7391-4168-7. Retrieved 18 April 2013)

MacIntyre converted to Roman Catholicism in the early 1980s, and now does his work against the background of what he calls an “Augustinian Thomist approach to moral philosophy.”(David Solomon, “Lecture 9: After Virtue”, International Catholic University: Twentieth-century ethics) In an interview with “Prospect,” MacIntyre explains that his conversion to Catholicism occurred in his fifties as a “result of being convinced of Thomism while attempting to disabuse his students of its authenticity.”(see, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/10/ alasdair-macintyre-on-money/) Also, in his book “Whose Justice, Which Rationality?” there is a section towards the end that is perhaps autobiographical when he explains how one is chosen by a tradition and may reflect his own conversion to Roman Catholicism.( see, Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality? 1988, 393-395) 

Fuller accounts of MacIntyre’s view of the relationship between philosophy and religion in general and Thomism and Catholicism in particular can be found in his essays “Philosophy recalled to its tasks” and “Truth as a good” (both found in the collection The Tasks of Philosophy) as well as in the survey of the Catholic philosophical tradition he gives in God, Philosophy and Universities.( see, Alisdair Macityre, The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); God, Philosophy and Universities (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009)

Alisdair MacIntyre objects to the Enlightenment abstraction of man out of community and out of history. In “After Virtue,” he also criticizes the rejection of meta-narratives and the fragmentation of the individual he views as the problematic postmodern response to the shortcomings of Enlightenment liberalism. In his fifteenth chapter, “The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life, and the Concept of a Tradition,” MacIntyre argues that man is “a story-telling animal.” All life is a unified narrative embedded in serval other narratives…MacIntyre argues that because of the inevitable fact of death, every life is a story long before someone posthumously turns it into one. MacIntyre’s belief in life as an historical narrative embedded within myriad historical narratives should prompt historians to examine how we write about the past, not just whether to use narrative form, but what it means if stories are “lived before they are told,” and how to capture the embedded nature of one story within other stories (Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 212)

 

2.The life as a unified narrative

An imposing presence in contemporary moral philosophy, AlasdairMacIntyre is perhaps best known for his radical hostility towards modernity and the liberalism he regards as its specific intellectualand political embodiment. So, there are popular statement today, for example: life, however, is not a play. Nor is this life a joke, or if it is, it is the kind without a punchline. Life rambles. In contrast, Alisdair MacIntyre argues that life is indeed a play– each life, specifically, a play in genre of tragedy, because each life ends in death. MacIntyre associates the idea that life rambles with the postmodern fracturing of society and of the individual, which he finds destructive to the concept of virtue.Virtue, writes MacIntyre, requires a “concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end.”(see, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 204) “The unity of a human life becomes invisible to us,” he explains, “when a sharp separation is made . . . between the individual and the roles that he or she plays.”(Ibid.) In other words, postmodern society fragments human life: “work is divided from leisure, private life from public, the corporate from the personal . . . childhood and old age have been wrenched away from the rest of human life and made over into distinct realms.”(Ibid.) The fractured individual then begins to speak of the virtues of a good banker, the virtues of a good student, or the virtues of a good artist, and the meaning of virtue devolves from the Aristotelian concept of excellence of character as a whole to mere skill or talent. To restore the Aristotelian concept of virtue, MacIntyre wants to restore the idea of life as a unified narrative. The unity of life is a fiction imposed and invented after death, never lived as reality. MacIntyre insists that stories are “lived before they are told.” Narrative is not the work of poets, dramatists and novelists reflecting upon events which had no narrative order before one was imposed by the singer or the writer; narrative form is neither disguise nor decoration,” he declares.

MacIntyre also uses the example of a recipe to argue that actions require not only narrative but also context to become intelligible. ” The instructions to break eggs, add flour, or mix in a bowl, however, are intelligible only if put in a sequence that tells the “story” of how to make a cake. In addition to a narrative sequence, the actions prescribed in a cook book also require a context to make any sense.  So, MacIntyre moves to the importance of context in the unified narrative of a human life. In the Enlightenment framework of the abstract individual, as well as in a postmodern “age of fracture,” MacIntyre believes, human life is often striped from its context, or else contexts become meaningless, playful, ironic, and interchangeable.

Against the spirit of his time, therefore, MacIntyre insists on the unity of human life and the importance of understanding each life as embedded in several contexts. “The narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives,” he argues, adding that “the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity.” ( MacIntyre, 218, 221)“I am born with a past,” MacIntyre affirms, “and to try to cut myself from that past in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide.”( MacIntyre, 221)Some of these interlocking, embedded narratives constitute a “setting,” which MacIntyre defines as an “institution,” “practice,” or “milieu of some other human kind.” “A setting has a history,” he writes, “a history in which the histories of individual agents not only are, but have be, situated.” “Without the setting and its change through time,” warns MacIntyre, “the history of the individual agent and his changes though time will be unintelligible.”     (MacIntyre, 206-207)

MacIntyre’s criticize of western modern moral philosophy provide a mirror in which are reflected the problems we will face in building a new system of morality. In the way about how to build a new system of morality and how to deal with our tradition, Polish scholars need to learn from MacIntyre’s insights. 

 

  1. Subversive arbitrariness

Alisdaire MacIntyre, he is of the opinion that  the present is intelligible only as a commentary upon and response to the past in which the past, if necessary and if possible, is corrected and transcended… But/…/ “We enter upon a stage which we did not design and we find ourselves part of an action that was not of our making. Each of us being a main character in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each drama constrains the others. In my drama, perhaps, I am Hamlet or Iago or at least the swineherd who may yet become a prince, but to you I am only A Gentleman or at best Second Murderer, while you are my Polonius or my Gravedigger, but your own hero. Each of our dramas exerts constraints on each other’s, making the whole different from the parts, but still dramatic.” 

“Whenever those immersed in the bureaucratic culture of the age try to think their way through to the moral foundations of what they are and what they do, they will discover suppressed Nietzschean premises. And consequently it is possible to predict with confidence that in the apparently quite unlikely contexts of bureaucratically managed modern societies there will periodically emerge social movements informed by just that kind of prophetic irrationalism of which Nietzsche’s thought is the ancestor. Indeed just because and insofar as contemporary Marxism is Weberian in substance we can expect prophetic  irrationalisms  of the left as well as of the Right.” Consequently he thinks: “unless there is a telos which transcends the limited goods of practices by constituting the good of a whole human life, the good of a human life conceived as a unity, it will both be the case that a certain subversive arbitrariness will invade the moral life and that we shall be unable to specify the context of certain virtues adequately.” 

“If my account of our moral condition is correct, we ought also to conclude that for some time now we too have reached that turning point. What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us.” 

“Modern systematic politics, whether liberal, conservative, radical or socialist, simply has to be rejected from a standpoint that owes genuine allegiance to the tradition of the virtues; for modern politics itself expresses in its institutional forms a systematic rejection of that tradition.” 

“It is yet another of Nietzsche’s merits that he joins to his critique of Enlightenment moralities a sense of their failure to address adequately, let alone to answer the question: what sort of person am I to become? This is in a way an inescapable question in that an answer to it is given in practice in each human life. But for characteristically modern moralities it is a question to be approached only by indirection. The primary question from their standpoint has concerned rules: what rules ought we to follow?” 

Can we know the universe is essentially mysterious…So, “contemporary moral argument is rationally interminable, because all moral, indeed all evaluative, argument is and always must be rationally interminable. Contemporary moral disagreements of a certain kind cannot be resolved, because no moral disagreements of that kind in any age, past, present or future, can be resolved,” MacIntyre has ever said. 

So, although MacIntyre had emphasized moral relativity, this did not mean that he was a moral relativist. The author compared MacIntyre’s and Hare’s approaches to the problem of moral relativism, arguing that MacIntyre’s virtue ethics could not and Hare’s metaethics could solve the problem of moral relativism. 

  1. Virtue in the Middle Ages

Let’s therefore outside the mystery, look for patterns of moral from the past. Our technological era accepts the thesis: “At the foundation of moral thinking lie beliefs in statements the truth of which no further reason can be given.”  “Indeed from an Aristotelian point of view a modern liberal political society can appear only as a collection of citizens of nowhere who have banded together for their common protection.” “In a society where there is no longer a shared conception of the community’s good as specified by the good for man, there can no longer either be any very substantial concept of what it is to contribute more or less to the achievement of that good. Hence notions of desert and of honor become detached from the context in which they were originally at home. Honor becomes nothing more than a badge of aristocratic status, and status itself, tied as it is now so securely to property, has very little to do with desert.” 

Scottish thinker noted that “the medieval world then is one in which not only is the scheme of the virtues enlarged beyond an Aristotelian perspective, but above all in which the connection between the distinctively narrative element in human life and the character of the vices comes to the forefront of consciousness and not only in biblical terms.” 

 “There is no way to understand the character of the taboo rules, except as a survival from some previous more elaborate cultural background. We know also and as a consequence that any theory which makes the taboo rules … intelligible just as they are without any reference to their history is necessarily a false theory… why should we think about [the theories of] analytic moral philosophers such as Moore, Ross, Prichard, Stevenson, Hare and the rest in any different way? … Why should we think about our modern use of good, right and obligatory in any different way from that in which we think about late eighteenth-century Polynesian uses of taboo?” 

“Moral judgments are linguistic survivals from the practices of classical theism which have lost the context provided by these practices.” Macintyre also said just this sentence: “Modern systematic politics, whether liberal, conservative, radical or socialist, simply has to be rejected from a standpoint that owes genuine allegiance to the tradition of the virtues; for modern politics itself expresses in its institutional forms a systematic rejection of that tradition.” 

Some philosophers believe, history has became fragmented, tradition fractured, past culture and community life destroyed by modernity. Returning to the traditional virtues cannot solve our present problems, and reconstructing the life of virtue ethics is pointless. What is important in the reconstruction of moral philosophy is the conflict between individualism and moral consensus. To solve this problem we need to look to Marx’s practical philosophy. The study of MacIntyre’s political philosophy has been mainly concerned with communitarianism, even talk about the thoughts of the philosopher as a kind of small communitarianism.The philosophers also believe, they argued that the way out of the dilemmas of contemporary moral philosophy which MacIntyre had suggested was neither modern nor postmodern, but premodern. Large noteworthy MacIntyre’s thought, his critique of emotivism, modernity, the Enlightenment Project, and modern moral enquiry. 

So, we want to keep moral place to the present day. „Things standing thus unknown, shall live behind me! If thou didst ever hold me in thy heart; absent thee from felicity awhile, and in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain, to tell my story.”(see, W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, dying, to Horatio, Hamlet Act V, scene II)

 

  1. The greatest happiness of the smallest number

In the last chapter of “Whose Justice? Which Rationality?,” that those who think they must think for themselves will need to undergo a transformation amounting to a conversion if they are to understand “that it is only by participation in a rational practice- based community that one becomes rational. Thus, in this context, note that the attempted professionalization of serious and systematic thinking has had a disastrous effect upon our culture, Alisdair MacIntyre notes.  But “to have understood the polymorphous character of pleasure and happiness is of course to have rendered those concepts useless for utilitarian purposes; if the prospect of his or her own future pleasure or happiness cannot for reasons which I have suggested provide criteria for solving the problems of action in the case of each individual, it follows that the notion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is a notion without any clear content at all. It is indeed a pseudo-concept available for a variety of ideological uses, but no more than that.” (see, Alasdair MacIntyreAfter Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Third Edition)

The importance of MacIntyre’s argument about intelligible action is suggested by the problems he must confront to sustain his case. For example, he has had to deal often and critically with issues surrounding the mind-body distinction, as well as those who assume that a strong distinction must be drawn between facts and values (the assumed impossibility to move logically from an is to an ought). 

MacIntyre’s most concentrated statement of his understanding of action is in “The Intelligibility of Action,” an article written in 1986. Here he argues that essential to our learning to act is that we learn to behave in a way that others can construe our actions as intelligible. In other words, the intelligibility of an action depends on the narrative continuities in an agent’s life. Yet the ability to narrate my life depends on having narratives available that make my peculiar life fit within narratives of a community that direct me toward an end that is not of my own making. The intelligibility of my life, therefore, depends on the stock of descriptions at a particular time, place, and culture. I am, at best, no more than a co-author of my life.

Crucial for MacIntyre is the historical fact that one tradition of inquiry can put another tradition into an epistemological crisis (for his account of such crises, see the chapter in ‘The Tasks of Philosophy’ entitled “Epistemological Crisis and Dramatic Narrative”). Advocates of one tradition learn how to think in terms of another tradition”- and then they learn to identify the unresolved issues characteristic of the other tradition. Through such acts of the imagination, adherents of a tradition “may be able to conclude that it is only from the standpoint of their tradition that the difficulties of that rival tradition can be understood and overcome.”

Alisdair MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism relies crucially on a distinctivemoral particularism, for which morality and rationality are fundamentally tradition-constituted. In light of this, some have detected in his work a moral relativism, radically in tension with his endorsement of a Thomist universalism. I dispute this reading, arguing instead that MacIntyre is a consistent universalist who pays due attention to the moral-epistemic importance of traditions. Analysing his teleological understanding of rational enquiry, I argue that this approach shows how it is possible, dialectically, to reconcile the particularity of our starting-points with the assertion of universal truths.

That MacIntyre is intent on a division between philosophy and theology, a division I think unknown to Thomas Aquinas, confirms his claim that he works within the conditions of modernity. When we begin by asking what makes an action intelligible, we cannot avoid God- at least if MacIntyre is right. Like Thomas Aquinas, MacIntyre thinks every human being has a natural desire for happiness “which is achieved only in union with God, integral to which is a recognition of God as the truth and of all truth as from God, so that the progress through truths to the truth is itself one part of the ascent of mind and heart to God.” 

Finally the author is shocked by some of the statements made by the Scottish philosopher, The author is shocked by some of the statements made by the Scottish philosopher, especially MacIntyre’s Account of Rationality and the Theory of Destiny of MacIntyre’s Moral Philosophy. Though he would like to portray MacIntyre’s method in moral philosophy primarily as a new historical analysis, but also as a wise outline of a moral for our times.

 

Conclusion

Alisdair MacIntyre objects to the Enlightenment abstraction of man out of community and out of history. Author of an essay is profoundly interested in MacIntyre’s thought, which addresses the following issues: traditional narrative, restatement and arguments on Virtue Ethics. However I have objections about the possibility of virtue ethics in contemporary society. Author discusses the possibility of virtue ethics in contemporary society. Though, he also interprets MacIntyre’s understanding of the self as constituted by its relationship to community, and he discusses MacIntyre’s conception of the self in term of narrative, arguing that the self is not only the subject of narrative, but also the object of narrative. One has to emphasize more strongly in contemporary philosophy, the relationship between MacIntyre’s moral philosophy and the situation of Western morality, and to reconstruct Virtue Ethics with the method of teleology, author notes: Personally, after reading the writings of MacIntyre, author also noted, the thinker justifies his extraordinary proposition that without actual evils to overcome the virtuous life would be imposible.(Difficulties in Christian Belief by Alasdair C. MacIntyre; Religious Belief by C. B. Martin; see, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 71, No. 1, 1962, pp. 111-114). So, what MacIntyre offers, he contends, is a moral universalism that avoids the pitfalls of its liberal counterpart, and invites an important meta-theoretical shift with respect to the scope for toleration and social critique and toleration in contemporary pluralist society. So, this extraordinary philosopher, in order to rescue of human being in the technological era,, he insists on the responsibility of local communities. The flourishing of the virtues requires and in turn sustains a certain kind of community, necessarily a small-scale community, within which the goods of various practices are ordered, so that, as far as possible, regard for each finds its due place with the lives of each individual, or each household, and in the life of the community at large. MacIntyre prompts us to consider not only how we write history, but also how our own lives and intellectual development is embedded in the lives of others. Recognizing this, we might live out our tragedies with grace and virtue, and it is possible to achieve. Scottish thinker teaches also us how to look at Jesus as the Lord of history and of our Savior.

 

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