“La relation avec l’ autre est une relation avec un Mystere”

Stanislaw Barszczak, Representation and truth- the course of our recognition in neighbor according Emmanuel Levinas

Introduction

A month ago I attended a meeting of philosophers in Toulouse, France. In the summary-commentary on the International Colloquium we read: While studying the works of Emmanuel Levinas, the reader’s attention is frequently caught by the importance of the reflexion about alterity as that which goes beyond visibility, plasticity and materiality. To aim at giving a new account of his texts, taking as a starting point the question of representation could therefore seem paradoxical. Representation appears to be frequently put aside by Levinas himself or even disapproved of, as though it was destined to be overcome by a more fundamental reflexion and was no more than a mere phase without inner value. Is there in Levinas a rejection of form as if form could not occur except as a degradation of what goes beyond form? If that is the case what then is to be done not only with art but with science as well? We are thus, on the one hand, grappling with what can be represented but incurs the risk of reducing alterity to a conceptual determination, and, on the other hand, what cannot be described and strikes intentional conscience in spite of intentional conscience itself. Considering that Levinas is neither a spiritualist nor an obscurant, his relation to form could allow us to comprehend anew his main thesis within the complex relation that aesthetics and epistemology establish in his work. The relation subjectivity entertains with what precedes it and what surpasses it, its relation with what is under it, on this side [en-deça], and its beyond [au-delà] raises the question of a significant limit between formalisation and openness towards the other. In the context of this symposium and starting from Levinas’s thought we propose to open a debate between the possibility of a radical renouncement of our conditions down here, in the place [dans le lieu], the uncondition of the non-place [non-lieu], and the beyond which escapes all representation. Is representation always a degradation of difference? Can we do without representation in our relation to the world? If representation is at the center of our existence, could it not, as a consequence, drag us into idolatry ? We would like this conference to be open to everyone: scholars, young academics / researchers as well as students and everyone interested in the question of representation. This international colloquium entitled “Representation and Otherness. Aesthetics and Epistemology from Emmanuel Levinas,” Toulouse 7-9 July 2015, it wanted to be open to everyone: professionals, young researchers but also students and listeners interested in the question of representation. The author of this study intends to support the thesis, tips and answers presented in this test. My text is in fact the necessity biased. Do not respond to all issues and problems of the international philosophical colloquium. It’s just a comment to this event, does not pretend to summarize the entire test, but the author believes the reader will find here new issues in the works of Levinas. In addition but to the main Levinas’s work “Totality and Infinity”, in this regard, it is especially very constructive work “Reality and its name”, in which Levinas criticizes destruction (demolition) of the representation, he analyzes strategy of the exposure for the presence of neighbor, firmly describes modality, doom-nakedness of the human situation of today.

  1. Recognition in the representation

The substantive “presence” is rarely used by Levinas. It ‘s was by other than him in the context of the first translations of Heidegger. Dasein was then translated by the presence, in particular in the partial translation of Being and Time by Rudolph Bohm and Alphonsus Waelhens. We find a trace of it in Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel or in the first writings of Paul Ricoeur. For Levinas, it is the existent, which, for example in “From the existence to the existent,” takes the place of presence. With “present” and “representation”, the presence plays a role which, by comparison, to appreciate what it is the representation for Levinas, in counterpoint to that he develop in “Totality and Infinity” and in “The reality and its shadow.”

The ambiguity between being and the thetic consciousness by Emmanuel Levinas is sought here explicitly. “The being is the ‘thematizable’ par excellence, proposable and thetic.” Why use a Husserlian concept to talk about the issue of being? The Levinas’s strategy is subtle: a) He does not say as was the case of Heidegger ones when the concept of truth related to worry for the accuracy, correction and vision, the process of unveiling (Aletheia) loses his privilege. On the contrary: the realm of being itself had its origin in a contemplation, in a vision. It is the ‘same’ that “will engage the subject of representation”;       b) intentionality plays a decisive role in the thinking of Levinas, since it accomplishes, beyond-famous report to the noesis-Noeme, thought as a paradox: while endorsing the primacy of the subject-object correlation, it finally to show its closing, that is to say its proper submission to the game of being. Intentionality carries the countless horizons of its implications and is thinking it is infinitely more ‘things’ than ‘object’ that is its purpose or where it fixed. That is why it causes the destruction of the representation; c) for intentionality can break its submission to the game of being, that is to say the diving of the mythical destiny is continually inside of the essence, we must disenchant phenomenology itself. The “reduction” in the sense levinasien will be the synonym of this disenchantment (Marchelo Fabri). She’ll wake up the subject from his effacement  by the presence, but paradoxaly, she will plunge this same subject in a “life that makes sense”, that is to say, she will teach him the true meaning of the representation that is not ontological but ethical ones.

Let’s start with the representation. „What is Now is not the present. What we are show now, it has already disappeared when it is shown,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel wrote that once day. In the representation we are facing, which in German means: Vorstellung. The present can not be “represented” because there is not an abstraction from now. What this is indeed the present, always articulated to the past and the future, protention or retention? It is the time of the origin, originating gushing (in German Usprung). This primordial bond opens a place of presence. With him, it’s time that unites and separates rather than is speaking, Hegel said. “Neither the place where I am present nor the present or I have a place, wrote Henri Maldiney, are places to rent for the spectacle of the universe.” (MaldineyHenri (2012): Regard, parole, espace. Vol. établi par Christian Chaput. -. ParisCerf, p.333). Emmanuel Levinas not seek to deny deformalize the Hegelian abstraction of now to find an original present every time again. But he finds himself quite in the position of being, that is “present to” somebody, or something like an address, or a solicitation. Be present, that is enunciate his presence as “Here I am.” This is the immediate ethical way: be present, that is by presenting answer. Is there Levinas has provided a critique of representation from the original present? Is there even was a discredit of representation, a suspicion in respect of him? These questions will accompany us here. Does this present time only le temps de l’origine that the damage to his neighbor is … However, we borders, hence should not be kidnapped present time. Here springs up again Lévinas’s “Me Voici”. I am indebted to the neighbor, he anticipates me his fate, and I am I’m a lesser, a small opening new perspectives in the world only. Representation manifests modality of the offering, that of becoming of the free thoughts is, for speculative intellectual authorities. But ‘the same’ representation has exposed a different modality, the gift of self. And it must be taken and assigned, because it is already the sense of immanence, we find one in the thought of Levinas.

This primacy of the same was Socrates’s teaching: to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside- to receive nothing, or to be free, Emmanuel Levinas has written in “Totality and Infinity.” ( I quote in my article the work of E. Levinas, Totalite et Infini, for English translating Alphonso Lingis, Totality and Infinity, DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY PRESS PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 2011, see p.43) In subordinating every relation with existents to the relation with Being the Heideggerian ontology affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics. But we are interested in the first line of ethics. Levinas draws attention of ours to the representation, and what about representation the thinker writes:”Representation is pure spontaneity, though prior to all activity/…/Representation is a pure present. The positing of a pure present without even tangential ties with time is the marvel of representation. It is a void of time, interpreted as eternity. ” (Totality and Infinity translated Alphonso Lingis, p. 125) The total freedom of the same in representation has a positive condition in the other that is not something represented, but is the Other/…/ in representation the I precisely loses its opposition to its object; the opposition fades, bringing out the identity of the I despite the multiplicity of its objects, that is, precisely the unalterable character of the I/…/To represent is not only to render present “anew”; it is to reduce to the present an actual perception which flows on. To represent is not to reduce a past fact to an actual image but to reduce to the instantaneousness of thought everything that seems independent of it; it is in this that representation is constitutive. ”(there, p. 126-127)

“The representation does not, certainly, the original report with the being. However, it is privileged; precisely as the opportunity to recall the separation of the same(du Moi),” Levinas wrote. (Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et infini, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961, Livre de poche; TI 1961/1974, I evokes here the first copies of this great work, I will henceforth quoted him as TI 39-40)” Total freedom of the same in the representation has a positive condition in the Other who is not a represented, but the Other. “(TI 132) “Representation is conditioned. Its transcendental pretension is constantly belied by the life that is already implanted in the being representation claims to constitute,(There, p.169) We have defined representation as a determination of the other by the same, without the same being determined by the other…To represent to oneself that from which I live would be equivalent to remaining exterior to the elements in which I am steeped. But if I cannot quit the space in which I am steeped, with a dwelling I can but approach these elements, possess things. I can indeed recollect myself in the midst of my life, which is life from. . . the recollection which draws me out of submergence, is not a simple echo of possession. We may not see in it the counterpart of presence to things, as though the possession of things, as a presence to them, dialec-tically contained the withdrawal from them. This withdrawal implies a new event; I must have been in relation with something I do not live from. This event is the relation with the Other who welcomes me in the Home, the discreet presence of the Feminine, Levinas wrote”(There, p. 170)

“The representation is conditioned. His transcendental pretention is constantly dementia by the life of already implanted in the claims to be the representation form. But the representation pretend afterwards (in niewczasie) substitute a reality in this life, to constitute the same reality. One must be able to account for the separation, conditioning constituent accomplished by representation…”(TI 183) Be present, that is enunciate her presence as “Here I am.” This is the immediate ethical way: be present, that is by presenting answer. Is there Levinas has provided a critique of representation from the original present? Is there even was a discredit of representation, a suspicion in respect of him? We do not know yet. Note on total freedom of the same (du Meme) on the representation. „La relation metaphysique (avec l’alterite d’autrui) ne saurait etre a proprement parler une representation, car l’Autre s’y dissoudrait dans le Meme, Levinas wrote”(TI, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961, Livre de poche, 27) The face-to-face with others, that is to say the interlocutory report to other that speaks to me and I talk to him, it differs from representational report to other to him I speak about. The interlocutory report to other contains two kinds of speech: 1 / the word addressed from another to me, and 2 / the word addressed from me to another.

For Levinas responsibility that is the imposible indifference imposible towards one’s neighbor (Totalite et infini, p. 219) The Other is given me as well as his speech. Understand speech of other starting of the representation of other. We have to hear the word of other starting of the reception of other as such. The Other who speaks to me does not deny to himself, but he makes me sense of his speech-discourse, he asks me to understand himself otherwise I understand my part, on my own. The face-to-face with other is incompatible with the representation of other, to the extent when these two reports can not coexist simultaneously on the same time. But there is “the opposition between representation and otherness of other according Levinas. The face-to-face with other is ‘irreducible to the representation of other’ (TI 224) as the “determination of the Other by the Same” (TI 184) “The representation derives its freedom from the world that nourishes her, from the relationship essentially moral- to the Other. Morality is not added to the concerns of the self(du moi), in order to subordinate or to judge- morality makes it in question, she has a distance to the self, the self itself “(TI 186) we ask here: does the present time is only as an initial time, “le temps de l’origine” ( an expression in French by Levinas), this time isn’t like a damage to the neighbor?  We begin by recalling that the presence and representation derived their sense of their relation to the present. Being oneself, with others, among things are trios existential (after Sein und Zeit). Levinas’ expression to be present for the other, that existential detaches from the other two, he reunite the self and the present, not the verb tense, but the total availability, the primary response, the call. Be present, for Levinas, it’s always answer: “Here I am” (I’m here). So, we need notice the richness over time “asymmetric relationships” with neighbor (the concept of Levinas). When man truly approaches the Other, he is uprooted from history. This is a great thing.

  1. Recognize yourself

Being is based on making proposals. With the suspended, sensitive we open horizons of the relationship before subjectivity. Our aim is, however, reveals the truth in representation. With the lack of time we skip here Levinas analysis of its important work “About the escape” and “From the existance to the existent.” What else in his principal work Levinas writes about it: “Critique does not reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but calls into question the exercise of the same. A calling into question of the same- which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same—is brought about by the other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics. Metaphysics, transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, is concretely produced as the calling into question of the same by the other, that is, as the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge. And as critique precedes dogmatism, metaphysics precedes ontology.”( Totality and Infinity, Duquesne University Press Pittsburgh, Pennsyvania 2011, p.43)

What it means to be yourself, what Levinas writes about it: “To be I is, over and beyond any individuation that can be derived from a system of references, to have identity as one’s content. The I is not a being that always remains the same, but is the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it. It is the primal identity, the primordial work of identification. The I is identical in its very alterations. It represents them to itself and thinks them. The universal identity in which the heterogenous can be embraced has the ossature of a subject, of the first person.”( I quote in my article the work of E. Levinas, Totalite et Infini, for English translating Alphonso Lingis, Totality and Infinity, 36)

Taking into account the comments from the first paragraph, am I free, or whether I belong to representation, whether I am in myself encompasses both of these categories and enrich them? When man truly approaches the Other, he even is uprooted from history. We expand the boundaries of the representation here. So, Levinas writes: “The representation constitutes certainly not the original report with the being. However, it is privileged; precisely as the opportunity to recall the separation of the same “(TI 39-40)” The metaphysical relationship (with the otherness of other) can not be properly telling a representation, because the Other, he would dissolve there as in the Same “(TI, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. Hardback, 27).

 “The Other, the significant- he manifests in speech when speaking from the world and not from his part, he manifests by offering the world, the thematizing this world. Thematisation manifests the Other, because the proposal that poses and offers the world, does not float in the air, but it promises an answer to the one who receives this proposal and that goes to the Other, since he receives in its proposal, the possibility of querying “(TI 98)

But “the Other is neither initially nor ultimately what we grasp or what we do our theme. But the truth is neither the view nor in enter – modes of enjoyment, sensitivity and possession. She is in the absolute transcendence where the absolute exteriority is present to put in a movement, which is to take over and to decipher, at any time, the same signs that she issued.”(TI 187)

Following the Second World War we have to ask whether the concept of responsibility still makes sense and usually has a meaning once again the existence and reality of the basis of morality. So the notion of responsibility become the term-key of a general thought of otherness where the analysis of the Other occupies the largest square. To be responsible is to first consider the other, that is to say, what we must to keep attention on the Other, even before of being responsible for his actions. The sense of absolute intersubjectivity reclame new philosophical approach by Levinas. The admiration of Levinas on Husserl has always been very high, but the error of Husserl (as Levinas says) is to think the other think too partially, without trying to grasp adequately making it the specificity and the condemnation; so, there is the idea that it is possible to understand the other as an alter ego. The thesis that Levinas opposes Husserl, it is that of the existence of an infinite, a Transcendence, or an Other irreducible to any thought of the Same (Meme). The infinitely Other, that is what is not reducible to the totality. The category of otherness do not belong to the same genus of the other categories: it is not a difference in the sense that an individual is different from another. “The relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery.” (Le Temps and the other (1948), Paris PUF 1994, p. 63)

We do not stop at all here for the elements of the intersubjectivity according Levinas. Recall: (anxiety, desire of escape, the naussee, grief, jouissence, the insomnia, there- il y a). We leave these issues open to others. The otherness of other for understanding the Levinasian responsibility, it fully expressed in the description of the face of the other. “The manner in its present the Other exceed the idea of the other in me, we call it, in fact, face.” (E.Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p.21) Face is not ability of ability (Visage c’est non pouvoir de pouvoir, p. 211.216) Levinas thinks: The charity is imposible without love (Entre nous, p. 131). Because I’m always here, thinker finally directs us towards his prophetic thoughts toward the concept of substitution.(see, Autrement qu’etre ou au-dela de l’ essence, p.12) Other is the only being that I can want to kill (Totality and Infinity, p. 216,217). I exist as responsible for the faults of others (“j’éxiste comme responsable des fautes d’ autrui”). “The interrogative space is initially asymmetrical” (De l’ existence a l’ existant (1947) Paris, Vrin, 1988, p.175, 163) So, let’s start yourself recognize at all – this is a task for us. From otherness we should move towards the only responsibility for brother.  My single election takes this responsibility, to a measure of mother of God, which keeps on hands the dying her son. It may come from the nudity of the Pieta Michal Aniol from the Basilica of saint Peter in Rome, which of very far exceeds the plastic form of the reality of some time. Pieta externally constituted by the interior always, absence even form. What it is my only bond, it is a native obligation of ours (A l’heure des nations, Paris, Edition de Minuit 1988, p.128). We have to do everything, lest neighbor lived; so, I was not deaf to this appeal. (ibid, p.219)

  1. Mutual recognition

In  “Totality and Infinity”we read: “Calling into question of the same—which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same- is brought about by the other.”(see, E.Levinas, Calosc i nieskonczonosc. Esej o zewnetrznosci, translating Malgorzata Kowalska, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2012, s. 31) So, one day of Emmanuel Levinas the author looked into the Bible, and there we read: Generated, not created. woman and man God created them. “So what I wanted, Lord, does not exist … The two sexes shall die, each of its rating.” (Alfred de Vigny, The wrath of Samson). But that world thought of God is, on the bible I find it. Later I came to the thought that this projection of wisdom of creation under the influence of God’s spirit is. We have to be the sons of God, Beings eminently free (see, Hans Uhr von Balthazar). E. Levinas located in the heart of his reflection the phenomenological concept of the responsibility which means the primacy of the Other in the call that he addresses me: the ethics is not based on a subjectivity that ensures itself; it is the recognition of a originally debt vis-à-vis the other. Far from being the first initiative of same ‘me’, speech is a response which raises in circle of the existence of the other.

Modern authors underline Levinas’ transition from the ethics to the language of responsibility. We have to understand speech of other. Levinas opens the horizon of sense and language – “say is joining others (Otherwise, p. 80) We have to hear the word of other, not receive the others as such. Others who speak to me, he gives me a sense of his speech, which asks me to hear otherwise I understand my part. At the colloquium was talking about the redefinition of the concept of representation from different trios Elements of representation: the “enjoyment”, “home” and “speech”, about the critical essence of representation which “goes beyond its origin” (TI 81) to question the self-same s’ accomplished by the questioning of the Same by the Other. Someone say about the linguistic fight, of a criticism of something, which is a representation. Presented there the redefinition of the concept of truth from these trios aspects of representation. The truth is in 1 / speech of others that challenges my part of understanding and thematizes the “given”; 2 / in the word of me (“pretension”) to justify to others. Now the responsibility is “impossible indifference” towards one’s neighbor (see, Totalite et infini, p. 219)  In this context, the question was about the need to save the representation in order to disenchant her for the neighbor. Levinas directs toward invisibility, individuality, rapprochement not personal, unsubjekt and objekt at the same time. Let’s try shine for one’s neighbor (resplendir, very beautiful word in the dictionary Levinas). In such a situation, we would see only a fully positive challenge by Lévinas: “Me Voici.” Representation manifests modality in an offering, that is, of becoming free of thoughts, speculative intellectual authorities. But the same representation has exposed a different modality, the gift of self. And it must be taken and assigned, because it is already the sense of immanence, we find that in thought of Levinas.

Summary:

Intentionality carries the countless horizons of its implications. Intentionality according Emmanuel Levinas can break its submission to the game of being, that is to say the diving of the mythical destiny is continually inside of the essence. So, we must as well disenchant phenomenology as ethics itself.  Pralogical participation leads to the secularization of being, it suggests a fracture of totality, but in return logical connections presupposes above all the world thematisation. The conflict with the world is representation. Levinas is faithful to an abstraction … more aesthetic image of things. So, to help rebuild the social bond, their structure and the anchoring in the situation of the world, that is a work of the author and his suggestion for the people of our generation. Levinas’ expression “to be present” for the other, that existential detaches from the other two, he reunite the self and the present, not the verb tense, but the total availability, the primary response, the call of neigbor. Be present, for Levinas, it’s always answer: “Here I am” (I’m here). So, we need notice the richness over time “asymmetric relationships” with the others.

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