Imposed fate of the people 51

Stanislaw Barszczak, The last 10 months of the second world war by John Kershaw

The Leipzig Book Fair (German: Leipziger Buchmesse) is the second largest book fair in Germany after the Frankfurt Book Fair. The fair takes place annually over four days at the Leipzig Trade Fairground in the northern part of Leipzig, Saxony. It is the first large trade meeting of the year and as such it plays an important role in the market and is often where new publications are first
presented. The Leipzig Book Fair became the largest book fair in Germany in 1632 when it topped the fair in Frankfurt am Main in the number of books presented. It remained on top until 1945 when Frankfurt surpassed it to regain the number one spot. During the GDR era the fair remained an important meeting place for book lovers and sellers from both East and West Germany.
After unification, the fair moved from the Trade Fair House on the main market square to a new location removed from the city center. After the move, the fair experienced a renaissance and continues to grow today. Today, the fair aims to be for the public, above all, and to emphasize the relationship between the authors and the fair’s visitors. The new orientation is necessary to compete with Frankfurt Book Fair, which sees a much larger volume of industry trading. During the four-day fair Leipzig hosts over 1,800 events both in the city and at the fairgrounds, making it one of the largest events of its kind in Europe. The Leipzig Fair was one of the first to recognize the growing market for audiobooks and incorporate this trend into its concept. The fair is the site of the presentation of several important German book prizes. During my stay at international fairs in Leipzig I could see the presentation of the latest book by John Kershaw, titled “The End: Hitler’s Germany 1944-45” (Allen Lane, 2011). Why, he asks, did German politicians, soldiers and civilians continue their dogged, futile resistance in 1944-45? Why was there no internal revolt, like the one that toppled Mussolini? Why did the German people not protest when all was so patently lost? These are very valid questions. The last 10 months of the war saw a vast acceleration of casualty rates in almost every sector. Nearly half of all German combat deaths,
for instance, were registered during that period, while the escalation of the air war gave the world the horror of Dresden. Elsewhere, this was the period of the death marches of concentration camp inmates, the combat debut of the hopeless Volkssturm militia and of the mass rapes and mass suicides of German civilians. Given such tremendous costs, it clearly behoves us all to ask why Germany continued fighting against such murderous odds. Kershaw adopts a largely narrative approach, which – with various digressions – spans the period between
the failed attempt on Hitler’s life of 20 July 1944 and the German capitulation 10 months later. In this period, horrors at the front – such as the first Red Army incursion into German territory at Nemmersdorf in East Prussia – would increasingly be matched by horrors at home, as the murderous SS condemned to death all those who dared to resist or showed insufficient martial spirit. Of course, propaganda and terror are but two of the many factors that contributed
to draw out Germany’s demise. Loyalty to Nazism also played a role, as did other more nebulous factors such as the supposed innate obedience and conformity of the German people, and the Allied doctrine of unconditional surrender, which appeared to rob moderate Germans of a viable alternative to continued defiance. But for all the respective merits of these arguments,
Kershaw is convincing in laying the blame for the disastrous decision to “hold out” primarily at Hitler’s door. Not only was the dictator personally obsessed with the idea that a heroic defeat was preferable to any form of surrender, he had also concentrated such an unchallenged system of
power in his own hands that he was effectively able to drag all of Germany with him into the abyss. It is telling, indeed, that only Hitler’s suicide on 30 April 1945 opened the way to a German capitulation. Who is the author of this book? Sir Ian Kershaw (born 29 April 1943, Oldham, Lancashire, England) is a British historian of 20th-century Germany whose work has chiefly focused on the period of the Third Reich. He is regarded by many as one of the world’s
leading experts on Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, and is particularly noted for his monumental biography of Hitler, which has been called “soberly objective.” He was the leading disciple of the late West German historian Martin Broszat, and (until his retirement) professor at the University of Sheffield. Kershaw has called Broszat an “inspirational mentor” who did much to shape his understanding of National Socialist Germany. Kershaw served as historical adviser on numerous BBC documentaries, notably The Nazis: A Warning From History and War of the Century.
He taught a module entitled ‘Germans against Hitler’. His wife Dame Betty Kershaw was a Dean at Sheffield. Kershaw was born into a working-class Catholic family in Oldham to parents Joseph Kershaw and Alice Robinson. He was educated at the local grammar school. During his youth,
he became fascinated with the early modern and medieval periods when England was Catholic. Educated at St Bede’s College, Manchester, the University of Liverpool (BA) and Merton College, Oxford (D.Phil), Kershaw was originally trained as a medievalist but turned to the study of
modern German social history in the 1970s. At first, Kershaw was mainly concerned with the economic history of Bolton Abbey. As a Lecturer in Medieval History at Manchester, Kershaw learned German to study the German peasantry in the Middle Ages. In 1972, Kershaw visited Bavaria and was shocked to hear the views of an old man he met in a Munich cafe who told him: “You English were so foolish. If only you had sided with us. Together we could have defeated Bolshevism and ruled the earth!”, adding in for good measure that “The Jew is a louse!”As a result of this incident, Kershaw became keen to learn how and why ordinary people in Germany could support National Socialism. As a result of his work in the 1970s on Broszat’s “Bavaria Project”, Kershaw wrote his first book on the Third Reich, The ‘Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich which was first published in German in 1980 as Der Hitler-Mythos: Volksmeinung und Propaganda im Dritten Reich. This book examined the “Hitler cult” in Germany, how it was developed by Joseph Goebbels, what social groups the Hitler Myth appealed to and how it rose and fell. Also arising from the “Bavaria Project” and Kershaw’s work in the field of Alltagsgeschichte was Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. In this 1983 book, Kershaw examined the experience of the Third Reich at the grass-roots in Bavaria. Kershaw showed how ordinary people reacted to the Nazi dictatorship, looking at how people conformed to the regime and to the extent and limits of dissent. Kershaw described his subject as ordinary Bavarians, or as he referred to: “the muddled majority, neither full-hearted Nazis nor outright opponents, whose attitudes at one and the same time betray signs of Nazi ideological penetration
and yet show the clear limits of propaganda manipulation”. Kershaw went on to write in his preface: “I should like to think that had I been around at the time I would have been a convinced anti-Nazi engaged in the underground resistance fight. However, I know really that I would have been as confused and felt as helpless as most of the people I am writing about”. Kershaw argued
that Goebbels failed to create the Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community) of Nazi propaganda, and that most Bavarians were far more interested in their day today lives than in politics during the Third Reich. Kershaw concluded that the majority of Bavarians were either anti-Semitic or more commonly simply did not care about what was happening to the Jews. Kershaw also concluded that there was a fundamental difference between the anti-Semitism of the majority of ordinary people, who disliked Jews and were much colored by traditional Catholic prejudices, and the ideological and far more radical völkische anti-Semitism of the Nazi Party, who hated Jews. Kershaw found that the majority of Bavarians disapproved of the violence of Kristallnacht pogrom, and that despite the efforts of the Nazis, continued to maintain social relations with the members of the Bavarian Jewish community. Kershaw documented numerous campaigns on the part of the Nazi Party to increase anti-Semitic hatred, and noted that the overwhelming majority of anti-Semitic activities in Bavaria were the work of a small number of committed Nazi Party members. Overall, Kershaw noted that the popular mood towards Jews was indifference to their fate. Kershaw argued that during World War II, most Bavarians were vaguely aware of the Holocaust, but were vastly more concerned about and interested in the war than about the “Final Solution to the Jewish Question”.Kershaw made the notable claim that: “the road to Auschwitz was built by hate, but paved with indifference”.By this, Kershaw meant the progress leading up to Auschwitz was motivated by anti-Semitism of the most vicious kind held by the Nazi elite, but
it took place in a context where the majority of German public opinion was completely indifferent to what was happening. Kershaw’s assessment that most Bavarians, and by implication Germans were “indifferent” to the Shoah faced criticism from the Israeli historian Otto Dov Kulka and the Canadian historian Michael Kater. Kater contended that Kershaw downplayed the extent of popular anti-Semitism, and that though admitting that most of the “spontaneous” anti-Semitic actions of Nazi Germany were staged, argued that because these actions involved substantial
numbers of Germans, it is wrong to see the extreme anti-Semitism of the Nazis as coming solely from above. Kulka argued that most Germans were more anti-Semitic than Kershaw portrayed them in Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich, and that rather than “indifference” argued that “passive complicity” would be a better term to describe the reaction of the German people to the Shoah. In 1985, Kershaw published a book on the historiography of Nazi Germany entitled The Nazi Dictatorship, in which Kershaw reflected on the problems in historiography of the Nazi era. Likewise, if one accepts the Marxist view of National Socialism as the culmination of capitalism, then the Nazi phenomenon is universal, Kershaw said, and fascism can come to power in any society where capitalism is the dominant economic system, whereas the view of National Socialism as the culmination of Deutschtum means that the Nazi
phenomenon is local and particular only to Germany. For Kershaw, any historian
writing about the period had to take account of the “historical-philosophical”, “political-ideological” and moral problems associated with the period, which thus poses special challenges
for the historian. In “The Nazi Dictatorship” Kershaw surveyed the historical literature, and offered his own assessment of the pros and cons of the various approaches. However, despite
his praise and admiration for Mason, in the 2000 edition of The Nazi Dictatorship, Kershaw was highly sceptical of Mason’s “Flight into War” theory of an economic crisis in 1939 forcing the Nazi regime into war. In regard to the debate between those who regard National Socialism as a
type of totalitarianism (and thus having more in common with the Soviet Union) versus those who regard Nazism as a type of fascism (and thus having more in common with Fascist Italy),
Kershaw, though feeling that the totalitarianism approach is not without value, has argued that in essence, Nazism should be viewed as a type of fascism, albeit fascism of a very radical type. In the 2000 edition of The Nazi Dictatorship, Kershaw wrote he considered Gerhard Ritter‘s claim that one “madman” (i.e. Hitler) single-handedy caused World War II to that of a German
apologist, and that he found the historical approach of Ritter’s arch-enemy Fritz Fischer to be a far better way of understanding German history. (continued text occurs for a while)

 

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