Imposed fate of the people

Stanislaw Barszczak, The last 10 months of the second world war by John Kershaw (continued text)

Along the same lines, Kershaw criticized as German apologetics the 1946 statement by the German historian Friedrich Meinecke that National Socialism was just a particularly unfortunate Betriebsunfall (industrial accident) of history. Kershaw was later in a 2003 essay to criticize both Ritter and Meinecke as German apologists who either through the Betriebsunfall theory and by blaming everything upon Hitler were seeking to white-wash the German past. Writing of the work of the German historian Rainer Zitelmann, Kershaw has argued that Zitelmann has elevated what were merely secondary considerations in Hitler’s remarks to the primary level, and that Zitelmann has not offered a clear definition of what he means by “modernization”. In regards to the Nazi foreign policy debate between “globalists” and the “continentalists”, Kershaw agrees with the thesis that Hitler did formulate a programme for foreign policy centring around an alliance with Britain to achieve the destruction of the Soviet Union, but has argued that a British lack in interest doomed the project, thus leading to the situation in 1939, where Hitler went to war with Britain, the country he wanted as an ally, as an enemy, and the country he wanted as an enemy, the Soviet Union, as his ally. At the same time, Kershaw sees considerable merit in the work of such historians as Timothy Mason, Hans Mommsen, Martin Broszat and Wolfgang Schieder, who argue that Hitler had no “programme” in foreign policy, and instead contend that his foreign policy was simply a kneejerk reaction to domestic pressures in the economy and his need to maintain his popularity. In regards to the historical debates about Widerstand (resistance) in German society, Kershaw has argued that there are two approaches to the question, one of which he calls the fundamentalist (dealing with those committed to overthrowing the Nazi regime) and the societal (dealing with forms of dissent in “everyday life”). In Kershaw’s viewpoint, Broszat’s Resistenz (immunity) concept works well in an Alltagsgeschichte approach, but works less well in the field of high politics, and moreover by focusing only on the “effect” of one’s actions, fails to consider the crucial element of the “intention” behind one’s actions. Kershaw has argued that the term Widerstand should be used only for those working for the total overthrow of the Nazi system, and those engaging in behavior which was counter to the regime’s wishes without seeking to overthrow the regime should be included under the terms opposition and dissent, depending upon their motives and actions. In Kershaw’s opinion, there were three bands
ranging from dissent to opposition to resistance. Kershaw has used the Edelweiss Pirates as an example of whose behavior initially fell under dissent, and who advanced from there to opposition and finally to resistance. In Kershaw’s view, there was much dissent and opposition within
German society, but outside of the working-class, very little resistance. Though Kershaw has argued that the Resistenz concept has much merit, he concluded that the Nazi regime had a broad basis of support and it is correct to speak of “resistance without the people”. Regarding the debate in the late 1980s between Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer over Broszat’s call for the “historicization” of National Socialism, Kershaw wrote that he agreed with Friedländer that the Nazi period could not be treated as a “normal” period of history, but he felt that historians
should approach the Nazi period as they would any other period of history. Like Broszat, Kershaw sees the structures of the Nazi state as far more important than the personality of Hitler (or any other individual for that matter) as explanation for the way Nazi Germany developed. In particular, Kershaw subscribes to the view argued by Broszat and the German historian Hans Mommsen that Nazi Germany was a chaotic collection of rival bureaucracies in perpetual power struggles with each other. In Kershaw’s view, the Nazi dictatorship was not a totalitarian monolith, but rather comprised an unstable coalition of several blocs in a “power cartel”
comprising the NSDAP, big business, the German state bureaucracy, the Army and SS/police
agencies (and moreover, each of the “power blocs” in turn were divided into several factions). In Kershaw’s opinion, the more “radical” blocs such as the SS/police and the Nazi Party gained increasing ascendency over the other blocs after the 1936 economic crisis, and then onwards increased their power at the expense of the other blocs. For Kershaw, the real significance of
Hitler lies not in the dictator himself, but rather in the German people’s perception of him. In his biography of Hitler, Kershaw presented him as the ultimate “unperson”; a boring, pedestrian man devoid of even the “negative greatness” attributed to him by Joachim Fest. Kershaw has no time for the Great Man theory of history and has criticised those who seek to explain everything that happened in the Third Reich as the result of Hitler’s will and intentions. Kershaw has argued that it is absurd to seek to explain German history in the Nazi era solely through Hitler as Germany had sixty-eight million people during the Third Reich, and to seek to explain the fate of sixty-eight million people solely though the prism of one man is in Kershaw’s opinion a flawed position. Kershaw has a low opinion of those who seek to provide “personalized” theories about the
Holocaust and/or World War II as due to some defect, medical or otherwise in Hitler. In his 2000 edition of The Nazi Dictatorship, Kershaw quoted with approval the dismissive remarks
made by the German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler in 1980 about such theories. Wehler wrote: “Does our understanding of National Socialist policies really depend on whether Hitler had only one testicle?…Perhaps the Führer had three, which made things difficult for him, who knows?…Even if Hitler could be regarded irrefutably as a sado-masochist, which scientific interest does that further?…Does the “Final Solution of the Jewish Question” thus become more easily understandable or the “twisted road to Auschwitz” become the one-way street of a psychopath
in power?”Kershaw shares Wehler’s opinion, that, besides the problem that such theories about Hitler’s medical condition were extremely difficult to prove, they had the effect of personalizing the phenomena of Nazi Germany by more or less attributing everything that happened in the Third Reich to one flawed individual. Kershaw’s biography of Hitler is an examination of
Hitler’s power; how he obtained it and how he maintained it. Following up on ideas that he had first introduced in a 1991 book about Hitler, Kershaw has argued that Hitler’s leadership is a model example of Max Weber‘s theory of Charismatic leadership. Kershaw’s 1991 book “Hitler: A Profile in Power” marked a change for Kershaw from writing about how people viewed Hitler to about Hitler himself. In his two-volume biography of Hitler published in 1998 and 2000, Kershaw stated “What I tried to do was to embed Hitler into the social and political context that I had already studied”. Kershaw finds the picture of Hitler as a “mountebank” (opportunistic adventurer) in Alan Bullock‘s biography unsatisfactory, and Joachim Fest‘s quest to determine how “great” Hitler was senseless. In a wider sense, Kershaw sees the Nazi regime as part of a
broader crisis which afflicted European society from 1914 to 1945. Through in disagreement with many of their claims (especially Nolte’s), Kershaw’s concept of a “Second Thirty Years’ War” reflects many similarities with Ernst Nolte, A. J. P. Taylor and Arno J. Mayer who have also advanced the concept of a “Thirty Years’ Crisis” to explain European history between 1914–1945. So, Kershaw has argued in his two-volume biography of Hitler that Hitler did play a decisive
role in the development of policies of genocide, but also argued that many of the measures that led to the Holocaust were undertaken by many lower-ranking officials without direct orders from Hitler in the expectation that such steps would win them favour. Though Kershaw does not deny the radical anti-Semitism of the Nazis, he favors Mommsen’s view of the Holocaust being
caused by the “culminative radicalization” of the Third Reich caused by the endless bureaucratic power struggles and a turn towards increasingly radical anti-Semitism within the Nazi elite. Kershaw accepts the picture of Hitler drawn by intentionalist historians as a fanatical ideologue who was obsessed with Social Darwinism, völkisch anti-Semitism (in which the Jewish people were viewed as a “race” biologically different from the rest of humanity rather than a
religion), militarism and the perceived need for Lebensraum. However, in a 1992 essay, “‘Improvised genocide?'”, in which Kershaw traces how the ethnic cleansing campaign of Gauleiter Arthur Greiser in the Warthegauregion annexed to Germany from Poland in 1939 led to a campaign of genocide by 1941, Kershaw argued that the process was indeed “improvised genocide” rather the fulfilment of a masterplan. Kershaw’s views the Holocaust not as a
plan as argued by the intentionists, but rather a process caused by the “culminative radicalization” of the Nazi state as articulated by the functionalists. Citing the work of the American historian Christopher Browning in his biography of Hitler, Kershaw argues that in the period 1939–41 the phrase “Final Solution to the Jewish Question” was a “territorial
solution”, that such plans as the Nisko Plan and Madagascar Plan were serious and only in the latter half of 1941 did the phrase “Final Solution” come to refer to genocide. This view of the Holocaust as a process rather than a plan is the antithesis of the extreme intentionist approach, who argue that Hitler had decided upon genocide as early as November 1918, and that everything he did from that time onwards was directed towards that goal. In recent years Kershaw has come to form a thesis based on the ideas of both traditions of Nazi theory. Kershaw disagrees with Mommsen’s “Weak Dictator” thesis: the idea that Hitler was a
relatively unimportant player in the Third Reich. However, he has agreed with his idea that Hitler did not play much of a role in the day-to-day administration of Nazi Germany. Kershaw’s way of explaining this paradox is his theory of “Working Towards the Führer”, the phrase being taken from a 1934 speech by the Prussian civil servant Werner Willikens. Kershaw has argued that in Nazi Germany, officials of both the German state and Party bureaucracy usually took the
initiative in beginning policy to meet Hitler’s perceived wishes, or alternatively attempted to turn into policy Hitler’s often loosely and indistinctly phrased wishes. Though Kershaw does agree that Hitler possessed the powers that the “Master of the Third Reich” thesis championed by
Norman Rich and Karl Dietrich Bracher would suggest, Kershaw has argued that Hitler was a “Lazy Dictator”; an indifferent dictator who really did not have the interest to involve himself
much in the daily running of Nazi Germany. The only exceptions were the areas of foreign policy and military decisions, both areas that Hitler increasingly involved himself in from the late 1930s. In a 1993 essay entitled “‘Working Towards the Führer'”, Kershaw argued that the German and
Soviet dictatorships had more differences than similarities. Kershaw argued that Hitler was a very unbureaucratic leader who was highly averse to paper work in marked contrast to Stalin. Likewise, Kershaw argued that Stalin was highly involved in the running of the Soviet Union in contrast to Hitler whose involvement in the day to day decision making was limited, infrequent and capricious. Kershaw argued that the Soviet regime, despite all of its extreme brutality and utter ruthlessness was basically rational in its goal of seeking to modernize a backward country and had no equivalent of the “cumulative radicalization” towards increasingly irrational goals that Kershaw sees as marking Nazi Germany. In Kershaw’s opinion, Stalin’s power corresponded to
Weber’s category of bureaucratic authority whereas Hitler’s power corresponded to Weber’s category of charismatic authority. In Kershaw’s view, what happened in Germany after 1933 was the imposition of Hitler’s charismatic authority on top of the “legal-rational” authority system that had existed prior to 1933, leading to a gradual breakdown of any system of ordered authority in
Germany. Kershaw argues that by 1938, the German state had been reduced to a hopeless, polycratic shambles of rival agencies all competing with each other to win Hitler’s favor, which by that time had become the only source of political legitimacy. Kershaw sees this rivalry as causing the “cumulative radicalization” of Germany, and argues that though Hitler always favored
the most radical solution to any problem, it was German officials themselves in attempting to win the Führer’s approval who for the most part carried out on their own initiative increasingly “radical” solutions to perceived problems like the “Jewish Question” as opposed to being ordered to do so by Hitler. In this, Kershaw largely agrees with Mommsen’s portrait of Hitler as a distant and remote leader standing in many ways above his own system, whose charisma and ideas served to set the general tone of politics. As an example of how Hitler’s power functioned in practice, Kershaw used Hitler’s directive to the Gauleiters Albert Forster and Arthur Greiser to “Germanize” the part of north-western Poland annexed to Germany in 1939 within the next 10 years with his promise that “no questions would be asked” about how this would be done. As Kershaw notes, the completely different ways Forster and Greiser sought to “Germanize” their Gaue with Forster simply having the local Polish population in his Gau signing forms saying they had “German blood” and Greiser carrying out a program of brutal ethnic cleansing of Poles in his Gau showed both how Hitler set events in motion, and how his Gauleiters could carry out totally different policies in pursuit of what they believed to be Hitler’s wishes. In Kershaw’s opinion, Hitler’s vision of a racially cleansed Volksgemeinschaft provided the impetus for German officials to carry out increasing extreme measures to win his approval, and which ended with the Shoah. The Israeli historian Otto Dov Kulka has praised the concept of “working towards the Führer” as the best way of understanding how the Holocaust occurred, combining the best features, and avoiding the weaknesses of both the “functionalist” and “intentionalist” methods.  Kulka argued that Kershaw demonstrated both Hitler’s central role in the “Final Solution” and why there was no need for any order from Hitler for the Holocaust, as the progress that led to the Shoah were “worked out” toward the Führer by almost everyone in Germany. Thus, for Kershaw Nazi Germany was both a monocracy (rule of one) and polycracy (rule of many). Hitler held absolute power but did not choose to exercise it very much; the rival fiefdoms of the Nazi state fought each other and attempted to carry out Hitler’s vaguely worded wishes and dimly defined orders by “Working Towards the Führer”.On the basis of the presented material regarding attitudes towards the Third Reich, which was removed from the Internet, we get a very interesting lesson
from the history of human civilization, regarding our consent to the wrong individual decision and attitudes with egoism, myopia and social acquiescence to a lack of generational replacement of Justice.

Leave a comment