Stanislav Barszczak: To come to the most intelligent man’s help
Listen to Chopin. Take long walks. Ask yourself what you did now. Do that every night. Before you go to sleep, ask yourself if the world is better because of you. After all, it’s your world. You are the world. So, take responsibility for your actions. Someone once said, “Excuses won’t lift your butt?” Listen to that. Believe that with all your heart. “Plus ratio quam vis.” Confess something about yourself to a friend-something awful, something you’d never want anyone to know. You’ll feel better. You’ll still see that you’re worthy of love. And since your friend is you, you are really just telling yourself. Have an interest in everything. Thirst for knowledge. Remember that it’s all about you. When you learn about other thing, you are actually learning about yourself. Get to know you better. Now, your behaviour is worthy of praise.
You face me, I am the one who, while enjoying my life in the world, am summoned to make place for you. By addressing me, you are the first who shows me the meaning of a human face. You open the dimension of ethics by the command that targets me when you look at me or speak to me. Independently of all your wishes and motivations, by simply being yourself, but against the ego-centered intentions of my enjoyment, you offer me a meaning for my life, which, thereby, is revealed as being more and different than a possibility of enjoying everything that comes my way. The meaning you impose on me lies in my devotion to you, my responsibility for you — not only for your future, but also for your past and presence with all the right and wrong they contain. I can become a saint by carrying your burdens with you. By serving you, I will at the same time accomplish, as far as I can, my own destiny…
But the Other is described in our work. I appear to myself otherwise than others appear to me: I do not look at myself and I do not speak to myself as if I were two persons at the same time, but, in a certain, further to be determined sense, I too am an Other for myself. If it is at all possible to experience myself as somehow commanding, summoning, or obligating me, this experience of my own otherness must be described in a simultaneously different and analogically similar way. Other is me! For you (the Other)also are needy, my responsibility for you includes your enjoyable use of worldly goods for making you good and happy. Your enjoyment of the earth and its elements is a purpose, and thus a part, of my dedication to you; even if I must sacrifice my pleasures to your well-being, such devotion belongs to the accomplishment of both your and my own destiny… The Other, Autrui, is you who, by facing me, awaken me to my incessant responsibility for you. This responsibility does not stop at feeding, clothing, healing, and protecting you against dangers. Your humanization demands education and civilization. It also includes my responsibility for your moral growth, which includes your moral awakening and your acceptance of your own responsibility. Within the limits that your singular destiny and your freedom impose on me, I am responsible for your responsibility. I awaken and encourage you, and cooperate with your taking responsibility for other Others: him, her, them, and… me!
Your being responsible for me confirms what I said above it links you and me by a double bond, which is stronger than any unilateral devotion. Mutual and generous(‘asymmetric’) responsibility, implied in the meeting of your and my own «heights», is essential for the universal responsibility that regards not only you, but all those others who may become and are already waiting for being linked to you or me: he, she, they and all of them.
When the great writer insists on my responsibility for the entire humanity, this seeming exaggeration is a consequence of the fact that every human individual has a face and that the unicity of each potential you is as absolute as that of you who face me here and now. The problem that emerges from the multiplicity of yous that obligate me, is that it seems to annul the infinity of your command and my total dedication: how could I be as completely and endlessly responsible for all possible or virtual yous as I am for you who here and now regard me? Will my being-for-you then not be scattered into minimal and irrelevant portions of service to innumerable yous?
The problem is aggravated by the fact that the pronoun «we» does not receive much emphasis in thinkers’ analyses. If the asymmetric relation that dedicates me to you cannot be reversed (you are also responsible for me), the emergence of an authentic we becomes very difficult, because then no ego, no I or me, can share in the rights of all Others. If, on the contrary, it is correct to state that the originary asymmetry is reciprocal and chiastic between each You and me, then we can at least speak of a nuclear We that unites you and me through a relation of mutual care from which some kind of solidarity or even friendship may arise. But even this is not yet enough for constituting the broader «we» of a society. Thinker mentions the human fraternity that issues from creation. He says here about the constitution of communal structures that differ from my interpersonal relations to other individuals.(Mitsein)
Does the latter question betray the unicity of each you or I? Must we maintain a radical and ultimate separation between all face-to-face relations and those social relations that tie us together as sharing members of encompassing communities, must we stick to an absolute separation between you and me, on the one hand, and a massive gathering that unites all of them, on the other?
It is certainly important to prevent your unicity and my own from drowning in the anonymous mass of a totalizing realm. Each individual’s destiny is so radically different from each other’s that no You or I can ever be reduced to a mere component of some higher, all-encompassing union or communal unity. Insofar as You or I are merely parts of a supra-individual or infra-singular reality, we are no longer You and I, but instances of one and the same universal that only allows for variations.
In the strong sense of You-as-high, you correlate with me, your servant, who find myself dedicated to you despite myself (malgré-moi). I discover my self as ethically situated and determined by your existence. But there are other figures of the Other in thinkers’ work, and, since each figure of the Other induces a corresponding figure of Me, there are as many configurations of «the I».
Within the horizons of the egocentric economy, my dwelling in the world would be cold and barren without intimacy with a feminine other, who creates the homely climate of a house. Phenomenology of dwelling shows that being at home (chez soi) in the world demands more than material protection. It also includes a human and humane companionship. When written by a man, such a phenomenology will easily evoke the feminine tenderness (la douceur féminine) of someone who, as such, veils and mitigates the rigor of persistent demands and commands by showing the welcoming warmth of ongoing hospitality. Thinker emphasized that the «feminine» component of «homeliness» can also be represented by men. The home of a homosexual couple, for example, would demand an analogically similar and different description.
How is the intimacy of a hospitable home related to the erotic intimacy of lovers who are driven by a seeking that is neither Desire nor a mere need, but still a form of mutual enjoyment open to a hidden future? Love opens a dimension that is neither merely needy, nor already ethical. Here I am not yet confronted with my ethical destiny. Being at home in the world and belonging to a history of love and procreation condition my self-appropriation and the realization of my destiny, but they do not yet show the ultimate meaning of human lives. The life always limited but real, degree fulfilled or to live, like Moses, for a history that goes on after one’s death. The «infinition» of a mortal life that is relived in others, history as messianic endeavor and expectation, is that the final hope that emerges from obedience to the unchosen but embraced election that consumes our lives? Is this the final meaning of «the I», of Me who find myself subjected to each and all of those who come my way? I suppose even the greatest uncertainty about the meaning of history cannot destroy my substitution for the Other(s). I like You.
I myself. Desire, Needs, You, He/She/They, the beloved Companion, the Father, and the Son, all of these reveal correlated figurations of Me. I am a multitude of figures, while maintaining one unique happiness. How can these figurations of my self compose one singular individuality? The main tension, or rather, the real struggle, that seems to split me in two different orientations is caused by the opposition between the Desire of the Absolute that draws me out of myself, on the one hand, and the needs that imprison me in a hedonic «interiority», on the other. Both orientations are constitutive of my existence, but they seem to exclude a synthesis. What I must learn and perform is a true or a conversion from my being steeped in narcissism to complete devotion. I must give my bread to the hungry, my energy to those who need help, my thoughts to the child that needs education. I must spend my life and work for the survival of the wounded, the liberation of the persecuted, and the salvation of the abused. But giving my life for others implies that I die and my needs with it. Are we summoned to sacrifice ourselves and to become saints like the Servant of the Lord? Must I hate my own life in order to be devoted? Insofar as human existence participates in being-as-intéressement, it is essentially egoistic. A thinker evokes a primordial level or dimension of being that precedes the interested endeavour of life. The «be-ing» of «there was» or «there is» must be characterized as the opposite of any giving or granting, as another thinker would have it when he evokes being’s generosity through the German formula Es gibt.
Thinker describes our being steeped in the unlimited and indefinable (apeiron) kind of being evoked by a burden from which we cannot escape, a meaningless charge that weighs on me and resists my liberation. It makes me guilty and accusable before I have had any chance to position myself with regard to the existence of the world, humanity, or myself. Its impersonal and wholly indeterminate obscurity is what weighs me down and makes me guilty by association. For it is only by awakening to faces that light and goodness are revealed to me, so that my existence may discover a meaning and a destiny. Then my addiction to life at any cost, the self-enclosing narcissism that never seems to abandon me completely, shows affinity with the tendential returning toward chaos that precedes creation. Transcendence, Desire of the Good, saves me from drowning in the burden (apeiron) that draws me down into an idleness from which only a more radical interest, the interestedness in your true interests, can save me.
So, we find the root of evil in the most primitive levels of being itself. Thinkers refer to a source that precedes the human capacity of making conscious choices: in acting badly, we are seduced, and by acting well, we testify to our being-for-the Other and thus to the Good that empties our egoism. Their description of being as a selfish effort portrays this self-promoting process as motivated by an unchosen kind of self-determination that precedes and tempts the human will. Being itself is driven by a tendency that prefigures the voluntary preference for my own interest over yours. But the Good itself, as «uncontaminated by being», is generous.
If my self-interested effort, my enjoyment, as participation in the all-encompassing intéressement of being, constituted my happiness, I would never be able to be completely dedicated to the Other, completely «yours». Not only would I then never be able to perform the infinite task of serving you, but I must then continually «expiate» the self-preference that I cannot stop performing. If I cannot put an end to my self-enjoyment, because I am imprisoned in my egoism, I am and remain necessarily guilty and stand rightly «accused» of not taking my being-for-you seriously enough. My guilt is aggravated if my obligations do not only signify my responsibility for your well-being, but also, more radically, my incessant substitution for you. As such, I am guilty of your guilt and responsible for your responsibility, liable for your misdeeds and the entirety of your life, like «the servant of the Lord».
I am responsible for you, so I cannot and should not take away your liberty, does not mean that my life can replace the entirety of your life, because this would erase your freedom and your own responsibility. Nor can I burden you with the entirety of my words, deeds, and thoughts. My life is then not empty but meaningful. as I live for you, I realize what I am supposed to realize as being always already dedicated to you, even if the ensuing emptying exhausts me. If I die because I let you eat my bread, I cannot indulge in materiality of life and neglect the interestedness of my needs; but does the realization of an utterly dedicated — and thus meaningful — life exclude all kinds of joy, contentment, delight, or jubilation? No! Even suffering can be undergone without destroying the experience of a certain joy that accompanies devotion. It is often necessary to accept pain, suffering, and death for you.
A different point of view on your and my survival can arise from scarcity. But always «I am happy about your success.» «I enjoy our conversation and your enjoying it». «I intensely desire that your best desires be fulfilled, even if it costs me a lot». «I am happy because you are happy and I would not be happy if you were not». However, if it is possible to show that my service and responsibility for your true interest does not exclude but includes the realization of my own life’s true interest, then my being-for-you does not destroy, but, on the contrary, fosters the main task of my life and the fulfillment of my destiny. This would not exempt me from sacrificing certain kinds of interest, not even from suffering and dying in your place, but it would integrate these sacrifices into the decisive meaning of my own life as much as yours.
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