Miejsce dla Innego

The place for an Other

Mr G. Chesterton said: “The old mystics spoke of an existence without end or a happiness without end, with a deliberate defiance, as they might have spoken of a bird without wings or a sea without water. And in this they were right philosophically, far more right than the world would now admit because all things grow more paradoxical as we approach the central truth. But for all human imaginative or artistic purposes nothing worse could be said of a work of beauty than that it is infinite; for to be infinite is to be shapeless, and to be shapeless is to be something more than mis-shapen.”
We know a sentence of R. Rorty: “Why did you turn away from religion? Was it because of the emphasis on humility? Yeah, partially that and partly I just couldn’t believe that God had actually been incarnated in one person” (Interview Joshua Knobe with You, first published in The Dualist, 2, 1995, pp.56-71). I know a little texts of Emmanuel Lévinas and Paul Ricoeur about our relations with other persons. In his later works, Emmanuel Lévinas in fact distinguishes the ego (cfr. in French language le moi) from the self (cfr. in French- le soi). The ego for Lévinas is the site of consciousness, the site of thematization, order, knowledge. The self, on the other hand, refers to the ethical structure of subjectivity. Now, for Levinas this “self” is not something we can assume and become. It is not a matter of becoming an ethical self. He consistently holds that this is a self with no identity, a self that is exiled, uprooted, with no homeland. But there are moments in human experience in which the ego is “driven back” or “driven beyond” the ego. This non-assumable movement is what Levinas calls “recurrence”. The ego finds itself troubled or interrupted by a fundamental responsibility for the other. Once again, this interruption is not for Levinas something we can hold onto and affirm as a state of mind. It is a pre-theoretical experience in which I find myself responsible for the other person prior to any act of the will. I find myself always already “substituted” for the Other, “obsessed” by the Other, in a “hostage” situation without having chosen it. For Levinas, subjectivity is constituted by the fact that I find myself responsible not only for the person in front of me, but for all people and even their deeds as well! As for conscience, Levinas rejects the idea of a Socratic daimon or a call of conscience. After all, such a “voice” comes from within the self. For Levinas, the call to responsibility can only originate from the Face of the Other. It is interesting to note that the French term conscience, which Levinas uses often, can be translated as either “consciousness” or “conscience”. This perhaps suggests that conscience is not primordial enough if we are to locate the origin of ethical subjectivity; it operates at the level of consciousness. I’m not too familiar with Buber, but your reference to the form of unity with the other; Emmanuel Levinas wants to preserve the absolute difference between Same and Other. Moreover, Levinas often criticizes Buber’s I-Thou relationship as symmetrical. He reads Buber as maintaining that the self and the other are thous for each other. On Levinas’s account, I am responsible for the other, but the Other’s responsibility is his business, not mine. The self for Emmanuel Levinas is not a construction, although he will constantly modify his account of selfhood over the course of forty years. For Levinas in the the 1940s, the self is described as the relationship with existence. In On Escape (1935) and in From Existence to Existents, Emmanuel Levinas complains that traditional philosophy has focused too much on the relationship with the world and has neglected the self’s relation to itself. On Levinas’s account, the self is dual. To exist is to be a particular thing, but also to be in a suffocating relationship with the brutal fact of existence. As Elisabeth Louise Thomas would put it, selfhood is mixture of anonymity and particularity. The brutual fact of existence weighs down on the subject and reveals itself as the imperative to act, to begin, to take up being in a certain way. This act of “taking up Being” Levinas calls “hypostasis”, which is a term that names the event in which pure being turns into an existent, an individual. Subjectivity, with its essential duality, is for Levinas active. This “activity”, though, is not a struggle for survival or a concern for the future or one’s death, but roots the subject in the very instant in which an act of being or effort occurs. The self is not a construction. Rather, it is the brutal fact that I have to exist and that this commitment to existence reveals itself as a suffocating burden, awakening the need for escape. Now, the relationship with the Other in From Existence to Existents does present itself as an escape from the brutal fact of existence.

When Paul Ricoeur distinguishes human time both from inner and from cosmic time, what he wants to do is call our attention to the time of human action and suffering. Only in and through the act of telling a story can this time acquire a figure and, in so doing, be preserved from oblivion as ‘time passes by’. Story telling makes it be that there is someone who can be referred to when we ask: ‘Who has done this?’, ‘Who has behaved in this way?’, or ‘To whom did such a thing happen?’ This comes down to asserting that an individual or collective entity can only be identified along with and through the act of composing what we call a narrative, be it of the fictive or the historical kind. As Paul Ricoeur states in a condensed formula: ‘the story relates the Whom of the action’. Or, as he also puts it: ‘the identity of this whom is no other than his narrative identity’. The notion of ‘a narrative identity’ allows one to think through the question of ‘personal identity’ in a new way, taking into full account the temporal dimension (the temporality) of a being who, by existing with others in the horizon of a common world, is led to transform him (her)self in the course of a life history, that is, who is what he or she is only in the course of becoming himself or herself. This notion also makes it possible for Paul Ricoeur to distinguish two dimensions: identity as sameness (Latin: idem); and identity as selfhood (Latin: ipse). The thesis I hope to develop here in outline is the following: Oneself as an Other shows that selfhood cannot be reduced to a form of narrative identity. And this, because the question of selfhood exceeds that of narrative identity… It is precisely this excess that brings to the fore the ethical dimension of the self, thereby inviting the question: how selfhood is associated with narrative identity, without being absorbed into it. Only on this basis is it possible to do justice to the ethical patterns embodied in the very act of telling a story. To put it otherwise: When we tell a story we inevitably prefer a certain course of action to others, we value one character and devalue another. The axiological neutrality of narrative is not equivalent to ethical neutrality.

We have to bear in mind that, for Paul Ricoeur, a ‘philosophy of selfhood’ is needed to replace the philosophy of the ego, the advantage being that the refusal of the latter makes it possible to dispense with the claim of a transcendental egology to furnish an epistemological foundation for philosophy. In opposition to an ego that, in a specific act of reflection, removes itself from the world, the self recognises itself as having been given over to itself, thereby at the same time acknowledging, as fundamental to its very being, its essential passivity. In sum, the self understands itself by being open to otherness and affected by it. It follows that, in its own apprehension of selfhood, the self feels itself vulnerable, exposed to others and to those actions of the other by which it is affected, and this whether the actions in question are its own or those done by others. This amounts to saying that this kind of self-apprehension encompasses a temporal experience which schematises itself as a life history. Thus, narrative identity presents itself as the essential structure of human identity and so of human self-understanding. Paul Ricoeur also holds narrative identity responsible for mediating between the two poles of personal identity, the pole of sameness (idem), referred to by what we call character, a set of innate or acquired attitudes and capacities, and the pole of selfhood (ipse), including trustworthiness and faithfulness to oneself, despite all the deviation and transformations which mark the path of life… The latter polarity is the key to what Ricoeur names his ‘philosophy of selfhood’, where narrative identity ensures a mediation between the two poles (character and selfhood). Character can be the object of a narrative thanks to a narrative identity through which it is referred to the temporal becoming of a particular existence. However, it is only when we return the pole of selfhood that the ethical dimension of a person (its personal identity) can be fully revealed.

By remaining true to oneself (with regard to which the crucial experience is that of keeping one’s word), the identity of the self emerges in response to the continuous changes which occur in the course of a life, and this in the form of a relation to an other which is constitutive of one very own self. The dialectical relationship involved in being true to oneself also makes it possible for the self to be true to others. As Ricoeur puts it: ‘to be faithful to oneself is for a person to behave in such a way that an other person can rely upon him or her’. My self-engagement in keeping my word makes it possible for another to trust me, which at the same time assures me of my own internal consistency, of my own identity. The result is not some sort of sticking to oneself by dint of stiffness or inflexibility but rather what is meant by being reliable, responsible. So, for Ricoeur, ethics has its place within a philosophy of selfhood. The corollary of this is the impossibility of reducing ethics to the question of moral obligation, as in a Kantian horizon, where the subject (viewed exclusively from a transcendental point of view) subjects himself to the categorial imperative as the form through which the moral law presents itself to him. Beyond the universality of the moral law, there is the aspiration for a true and good life. Because this could seen as something of a paradox, what now has to be done is to complete the Kantian ethics with an ethics drawn from Aristotle. But what does this call for a true life, placed under the sign of the Good and heard within oneself, actually consist in? Ricoeur answers: ‘I am called to live well with and for the other within righteous (fair) institutions’. This formulation lets us see how each one of us is responsible for developing his own answer to the injunction to lead a good life, a life oriented toward the Good. It is the diversity of our personal answers to this call that explains the variety of those narratives by means of which our life experiences get told. Through them we are confronted with the crises of identity that have affected the self in the past and that can even lead to a loss of self. Some of these crises may be analysed as permanent, as in cases where the self is diluted ‘for ever’.(The Man without Qualities) . But the self can also be presented in a multitude of facets. An approach of the coherence of a life in Oneself as an Other concentrates on the question of the intrinsic constitution of the self, excludes neither the experience of love nor the relationship established between the self (ipse ) and God. Only through just a genuine dissolution and destitution of the ego could the self be fully restored to itself by God, acknowledge itself as being a creature among the other creatures of this very same God. ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ (Lk 6.31). For, by starting out from action, the latter inevitably privileges the ethical dimension of selfhood at the expense of the affective and the mystical.

Paul Ricoeur taking as his point of departure, human action (which is itself never ethically neutral), Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self not only led him to a conception of narrative identity as forming an essential part of self-understanding but also to a recognition of the relation of the self to an other, a relation intrinsic to the very constitution of the self . On the third part of my book I describe the Self in possession of me. That self needs be on the best possible of the realization ourselves. There is here a problem not only what a state we are in but also a problem of being in the state indeed. I am interesting in the liberty of a person but before all I love the truth of our life. My Self may have of me but it depends on many reasons. Life is often messy, things don’t fit together as they should, we often don’t get what we want. There are the questions: Where does our need for love come from, and does it ever disappear? Or are we condemned, or blessed, to fall in love again and again and again? But by going out unflinchingly in front of us the philosophy of today is able indeed, without a trace of sentimentality or condescension, to reassure us – and to show us perhaps what life is really like. What natural right does not recognize is the place of struggle in the conquest of equality and justice, the role of negative conduct in the motivation leading to struggle: lack of consideration, humiliation, disdain, to say nothing of violence in all its physical and psychological forms. The struggle for recognition is pursued on several levels. It begins on the level of affective relations tied to the transmission of life, to sexuality, and to descendents. This struggle for recognition is pursued on the juridical plane of the rights of civil society, centered on the ideas of liberty, justice, and solidarity. Rights cannot be claimed on my behalf unless they are recognized in the same way for others. This extension of individual capacities belonging to legal persons concerns not only the enumeration of their civic rights but widens the sphere of application to new categories of individuals and powers previously scorned. This extension is the occasion for conflicts stemming from exclusions due to social inequalities but also those arising from forms of discrimination inherited from the past that still afflict various minorities. Disdain and humiliation, however, infect the social bond at a level that surpasses rights; this concerns social esteem directed to personal value and to the capacity to pursue happiness in accordance with one’s own conception of the good life. This struggle for esteem occurs in the context of different spheres of life: at work, the struggle to prevail, to protect one’s rank in the hierarchy of authority; at home, relations of neighborhood and proximity, together with all the many encounters that make up daily life. It is always personal capacities that demand to be recognized by others. The question then arises whether the social bond is constituted only in the struggle for recognition or whether there is not also at the origin a sort of good will tied to the resemblance of one person to another in the great human family.(end)

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